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NOTE
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IMPLICATIONS OF
A PRESIDENTIALLY DECLARED BLOCKADE OF CUBA
INTRODUCTION
The deteriorating situation in Central America has injected a
growing sense of urgency into the struggle to stem Cuban expansion-
ism.' Although efforts are being made to arrive at diplomatic solu-
tions,' the Reagan administration has warned that it would blockade
Cuba if necessary to stop the alleged communist backed funneling of
arms to Salvadoran revolutionaries.8 This threatened blockade raises
two important questions: (1) would such presidential action be consti-
tutional, absent congressional authorization; and (2) even if Congress
were to consent to a blockade, what constraints would international
law impose upon the United States?
With respect to the first question, this note generally considers the
constitutional allocations of the power to regulate foreign affairs, fo-
cuses more specifically on the allocations of the war powers, and exam-
ines the impact of the 1973 War Powers Resolution" on such a pro-
posed blockade.
Examination of the second question focuses on the customary
right of self-defense as recognized by international law, as well as on
the provisions of the United Nations CharterO and the Inter-American
Reciprocal Assistance Treaty (Rio Treaty)' which are germane to the
1. Mullin, Groping for Answers in Latin America, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec.
21, 1981, at 25. In the N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1981, at Al, col. 2, Edwin Meese 3d, the chief
White House policy advisor, renewed warnings that President Reagan would consider a
blockade of Cuba if necessary to preserve peace in El Salvador. Secretary of State Alex-
ander Haig has also warned that the United States will "go to the source" if Cuba con-
tinues to back the revolution in Central America. Id.
2. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1981, at A8, col. 1. A special document, entitled "Communist
Interference in El Salvador," has been presented to several allies with the hope of gain-
ing support for the emerging Reagan position. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1981, at Al, col. 1.
3. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1981, at A8, col. 5. In 1981, the guerillas themselves admitted
to killing over 6,000 persons including non-combatant "informers" and military and gov-
ernment authorities. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1981, at A8, col. 2.
4. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1973).
5. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
6. Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance, 62 Stat. 1681, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21
U.N.T.S. 77 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Rio Treaty).
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determination of the legality of a blockade, should one be implemented
against Cuba.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWERS
The presidential exercise of broad powers in the field of foreign
relations has become quasi-monopolistic in nature7 and is frequently
effectuated via the "fait accompli."8 In a world imminently capable of
self-destruction, 9 the potentially disastrous consequences of an interna-
tional misstep is generating inquiry into the wisdom and constitution-
ality of investing one individual with the sole discretion to exercise
such powers. 10
The text of the Constitution, however, sheds little explicit light on
who is ultimately to bear the burden and privilege of directing the
course of the United States in foreign affairs." Despite its extensive
allocations of powers capable of affecting our foreign relations, the
Constitution simply distributes those powers among the Senate, the
Congress as a whole, and the Executive without indicating which organ
shall have the final voice."2 Case law has established that the federal
7. Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1
(1972). Lengthy Senate procedures have done much to advance the nearly unilateral
presidential control of foreign affairs. Even avid supporters of greater congressional in-
volvement, such as Berger, admit the need for legislative reform if its participation is to
be effective. Id.
8. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS 185 (4th ed. 1957). Presidential
guidance is the paramount factor in shaping American foreign policy, and the fait accom-
pli is a potent tool for getting Congress to conform to the wishes of the Executive. Id.
President Theodore Roosevelt illustrated this point when Congress declined to finance
an around the world cruise of the United States fleet. D. ABSHIRE, FOREIGN POLICY MAK-
RS: PRESIDENT VS. CONGRESS 74 (The Washington Papers vol. vii, No. 66, 1979). Un-
daunted in the face of this recalcitrance, Roosevelt said that if he sent the fleet halfway,
Congress would have to pay to get it back. Id. While it is true that no presidentially
created diplomatic policy can survive for long without the support of Congress, this has
generally not posed a serious barrier to presidential initiative in the past. See E. CoRwIN,
at 185.
9. Modern technology has produced tools of destruction capable of obliterating states
with incredible speed from even more incredible distances. See McDougal, The Soviet
Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 597, 600 (1963).
10. Schlesinger, Jr., Who Makes War-and How, 63 A.B.A. J. 78 (1977). Controversy
over the presidential exercise of broad powers in the field of foreign relations resurfaced
in the wake of the American involvement in the Indochina War. Id.
11. E. CORWIN, supra note 8, at 171. The Supreme Court has held that although the
powers of Congress are limited to those enumerated in the Constitution, the powers of
the presidency are not thus limited and can be implied at least insofar as they properly
fall within the executive range and are not expressly forbidden by the Constitution. See
Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 118 (1926).
12. E. CoRwIN, supra note 8, at 171. Since the Constitution is completely silent as to
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government has exclusive control over foreign relations independent of
affirmative constitutional grants.' Where those grants lie, internally, is
not clear.'4 The standing" and political questions doctrines' have ef-
fectively eliminated the Judiciary as a serious contender for power in
this arena. The constitutional allocations that do affirmatively ap-
pear,'7 combined with the doctrine of concurrent powers,"8 have, how-
many powers asserted by both the President and Congress, it is argued that the Consti-
tution is the mediate rather than the immediate source of the external powers of the
national government. Id. at 172.
13. See, e.g., Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54 (1795); Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698,
711 (1889); Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915); United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1936).
14. As noted by Justice Frankfurter, "the fact that power exists in the government
does not vest it in the President." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 604 (1952) (concurring opinion).
15. The doctrine of standing rests on the article III requirement that the plaintiff
himself must be injured. See, e.g., Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 45 (1943) (doctor did
not have standing to sue on behalf of his patients). The question of standing is particu-
larly important with regard to issues touching on foreign policy since general interest, as
a citizen, is not adequate even when no one may qualify to sue under the actual injury
test. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
16. Any plaintiff who passes the standing barrier will still be faced with the long
established political questions doctrine if contested acts are related to foreign affairs. E.
CoRwIN,, supra note 8, at 176. The standards for identifying political questions are not
clear, but issues which are in the area of foreign relations are generally regarded by the
courts as more appropriately left to the judgment of a political department. See Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). As stated by one Court, "certainly it is not the function of
the Judiciary to entertain private litigation . . .which challenges the legality, the wis-
dom, or the propriety of the Commander-in-Chief in sending our armed forces abroad or
to any particular region." Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950). It is argued
by some commentators that when courts refuse to entertain a political question, they are,
in fact, deciding that the choices made were within the zone of discretion accorded the
political branches and therefore legal. See Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The
War Powers Act, 50 Tax L. REv. 833, 894 (1972).
17. Article II, § 2 provides that "[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy . . ." and that "[h]e shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls. ... Article II, § 3
states that "he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed .... " Article I, § 8 provides that
[tihe Congress shall have Power To . .. provide for the common Defense and
general Welfare of the United States . . .To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations... To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high
Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations; To declare war. . . To raise and
support Armies . . .To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers . . ..
Article I, § 9 provides that "[n]o money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in Conse-
quence of Appropriations made by Law .... "
18. As noted in E. CORWIN, supra note 8, at 175, the doctrine of concurrent powers is
1982]
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ever, spurred the political branches of the federal government into an
intermittent struggle for control."' Who, if anyone, will emerge victori-
ous remains for events to resolve. 0 American history has shown, thus
far, that the predominant power to determine the substantive content
of American foreign policy is exercised by the President."' Although
the source of this power has been primarily political,2" it also has sup-
port in judicial precedent."
Early resistance to executive primacy in this realm fell to pragma-
tism and presidential initiative. 4 As John Jay noted, the President's
sometimes called the doctrine of "co-ordinate powers," and it stands for the principle
that neither the House nor the Senate can be constitutionally bound by anything done
previously by the President in his capacity as representative of the United States in
foreign affairs. It is noteworthy, however, that this constitutional freedom has little effect
in the face of practical realities. Id.
19. E. CoRwIN, supra note 8, at 177. For the periods of congressional ascendancy, see
generally D. ABSHRE, supra note 8.
20. E. CoawIN, supra note 8, at 171.
21. Id.
22. Hamilton and Madison battled over this issue under the respective noms de
plumes of "Pacificus" and "Helvidius". See E. CoRwIN, supra note 8, at 179-80. Madison
argued that the presidential powers in foreign affairs were instrumental only, involving
no greater discretion than determination of "matters of fact." Id. at 180. He reasoned
that if it were otherwise, Congress would be constitutionally bound by the President's
acts and thus stripped of its power to declare war. Id. at 181. Hamilton contended that
while the President could not control the war-declaring powers, he could affect its use by
the legislature by determining the conditions of the nation through the exercise of the
inherent foreign affairs powers that are executive in nature. Id. at 179. The vindication
of Hamilton's argument shaped constitutional interpretations in two important respects:
1) the "executive power" clause became a respectable depository for unassigned powers
relating to foreign affairs; and 2) presidential powers in the diplomatic sphere were
treated as policy forming powers, constitutionally independent of Congress, though po-
tentially limited by it. Id. at 181.
23. Early political statements cited with approval by the Supreme Court have raised
to the level of dogma the propriety of presidential claims to power in the diplomatic
sphere. See Berger, supra note 7, at 15, 16. Chief Justice Taft, for example, accepted the
theory that the President, unlike Congress, could exercise powers that are not enumer-
ated by the Constitution as long as they were not forbidden by it. See Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). Henkin refers to this power to affect foreign relations as the
"unenumerated foreign affairs power." L. HNKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITU-
TION 68 (1972).
24. See E. CORWIN, supra note 8, at 178. Early presidential assertions of foreign af-
fairs powers appear timid in light of modem understanding. Washington's unilateral dec-
laration of neutrality in 1793 with respect to the war between France and England and
his later refusal to submit to the House of Representatives his papers relative to the Jay
Treaty negotiations were, however, important first steps in the Executive's gathering of
power in the sphere of foreign affairs. Even Jefferson, who had previously supported
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office has certain natural advantages with respect to the conduct of
foreign affairs, as for example, the executive's unity of office, capacity
for secrecy and dispatch, and superior sources of information."5 In
comparison to the houses of Congress, which are in recess much of the
time, the President is always available and ready for action."6
Perhaps the biggest boon to the executive claim to power in the
area of foreign affairs was John Marshall's declaration that "the Presi-
dent is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign nations. 2 7 When this theme was adopted
by Justice Sutherland in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp.,ss the imprimatur of the Supreme Court, albeit by way of dicta,
was stamped on the all pervasive presidential power over foreign rela-
tions.2' At issue in Curtiss-Wright was a joint resolution enacted by
Congress that authorized the President to declare the provision of
arms to nations involved in the Chaco conflict illegal, if it were his
opinion that such action would contribute to the establishment of
peace in the area. The sole question before the Court was whether this
was an improper delegation of power to the President.30 Nonetheless,
Justice Sutherland seized the opportunty to advance his theory that
the national foreign affairs powers were inevitable incidents of a claim
of sovereignty and "did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the
Madison's "Helvidius" writings, allowed no deviation from the President as the only
channel of communication between the United States and foreign nations. Id. at 182.
Although the earlier presidents did not expressly claim an inherent power to initiate
military actions, Congress deferred to their wishes and gave them broad delegation of
authority to carry out their foreign policies. See Schlesinger, supra note 10, at 79. When
Congress did attack the constitutional basis for such authority in the realm of foreigil
affairs, the President emerged with his power intact. See Rostow, supra note 16, at 894.
Abraham Lincoln's assumption of semi-dictatorial powers at crucial times during the
Civil War obliterated any trace of presidential timidity that may have lingered and set
the stage for expanded powers in the twentieth century. See D. ABSHIRE, supra note 8, at
29.
25. THz FEDERALIST No. 64 (J. Jay), quoted in E. CORWIN, supra note 8, at 171.
26. E. CORWIN, supra note 8, at 171.
27. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800). There is substantial disagreement as to the in-
tended significance of this statement. One school of thought is emphatic in its assertion
that the statement simply reflects Marshall's conception of the President's role as an
instrument of communication with other governments subject to congressional control.
E. CORwIN, supra note 8, at 178. The opposition, however, argues that this same state-
ment in context indicated the constitutional basis for direct executive agreements con-
summated by the President to the exclusion of the Senate. McDougal & Lans, Treaties
and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments
of National Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 535 (1945).
28. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
29. See Berger, supra note 7, at 26.
30. 299 U.S. 304.
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Constitution. '3 ' Echoing the famous words of John Marshall, he as-
serted the special role of the President
as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of in-
ternational relations-a power which does not require as a ba-
sis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like
every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordi-
nation to the applicable provisions of the Constitution."'
Despite the considerable criticism that has followed this case," Cur-
tiss-Wright has long been cited with approval for the proposition that
the field of foreign affairs is the President's exclusive domain."
It is clear from the development of the United States foreign rela-
tions power that certain areas have been entrusted to the President
exclusively: the power to recognize and negotiate with foreign nations;
the power to deploy troops and to command them in hostilities; and
the power to conclude an armistice.3 5 The various shadings of the war
powers, however, comprise a "delicate fabric of checks and balances"3 6
wherein the powers of the President and Congress are intimately
bound together.
WAR POWERS
Justice Jackson stated in Woods v. Miller Co.:
31
No one will question that this power is the most dangerous one
to free government in the whole catalogue of powers. It usually
is invoked in haste and excitement when calm legislative con-
sideration of constitutional limitation is difficult. It is executed
in a time of patriotic fervor that makes moderation unpopular.
And, worst of all, it is interpreted by judges under the influ-
31. 299 U.S. at 315-17. See also Berger, supra note 7, at 26-27.
32. 299 U.S. at 320 (emphasis added).
33. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 7, at 26; Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An
Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946).
34. Berger, supra note 7, at 26. Although some like Raoul Berger bemoan the extent
to which Curtiss-Wright has become the foundation for subsequent decisions buttressing
Executive claims to broad powers in foreign affairs, others find merit in its holding. See,
e.g., E. CORWIN, supra note 8, at 172; L. HENKIN, supra note 23, at 24; McDougal & Lans,
supra note 27, at 255-58. For a case citing Curtiss- Wright with approval, see United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942).
35. E. CORWIN, supra note 8, at 171. Some powers, like the authority to issue a decla-
ration of neutrality, are shared with Congress. Rostow, supra note 16, at 864.
36. Davi v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 478, 482-83 (W.D. Va. 1970).
37. Woods, Housing Expediter v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948).
[Vol. 3
PRESIDENTIAL BLOCKADE OF CUBA
ence of the same passions and pressures."
As with foreign affairs powers generally, the complete constitutional
scheme for the allocation of the "vague, undefined and undefinable
'war power' "s is difficult to discern.'0 Only Congress can declare war;
provide for calling up the militia; make rules concerning capture on
land and water; raise, support and regulate the armed forces; and ap-
propriate the funds necessary for the financing of war.' 1 On the other
hand, the President has a constitutional duty that goes beyond defend-
ing against sudden attacks.'2 The President is the Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy ' and in that capacity might threaten or even
provoke war by ordering military actions short of war that are not au-
thorized by Congress." As Chief Executive, the duty to "take care that
the laws be faithfully executed" falls on him.'5 Since those laws include
international law, it has devolved on the President, from the outset, to
protect American rights and discharge American duties under the law
of nations.46 Presidential authority to exercise duties during wartime is
unquestioned but delineation of the peacetime command power is
problematic.' 7 The Commander in Chief clause does not distinguish
between war and peace but peacetime command is necessarily limited
by the congressional war-declaring power.'8
The Constitution does not, however, preclude congressional dele-
gation of authority to the President.49 The Supreme Court has sug-
gested that delegations that facilitate the conduct of foreign affairs
may be broad indeed.50 Should Congress fail to indicate its position
vis-a-vis a particular subject over which it has ultimate control, the
President arguably has adequate power to act until Congress restrains
or directs him." Any other conclusion could operate to seriously under-
38. Id. at 146 (Jackson, J., concurring).
39. Id.
40. King & Leavens, Curbing the Dogs of War. The War Powers Resolution, 18
H~Av. INT'L L.J. 55, 64 (1977).
41. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
42. Rostow, supra note 16, at 865.
43. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
44. King & Leavens, supra note 40, at 57.
45. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
46. E. CORWIN, supra note 8, at 194.
47. King & Leavens, supra note 40, at 60.
48. U.S.CoNST. art. I, § 8. See also Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d. 302, 305 (2d Cir. 1970).
See generally King & Leavens, supra note 40.
49. See A.D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AsvAms AND CONSTIMONAL POWER 4, 5 (1976).
50. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S 579,635-36 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S 304, 321-22 (1936).
51. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637. As Justice Jackson stated in his now famous exami-
19821
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mine the nation's security. The legitimacy of such action may be
grounded on the President's effective control of foreign affairs, his duty
to execute the law and the power implicit in his role as Commander in
Chief.5 2 Thus the President may and often has ventured into the twi-
light between purely peacetime deployments of military force and
those deployments demanded by a sudden and grave emergency." This
results in occasional showdowns between Congress and the President,
usually stemming from situations involving congressional delegation or
congressional silence." It is then that the seeming incompatability of
congressional control of the declaration of war and presidential control
of armed forces manifests itself in political struggle."
Such political struggle may well have been the intent of the Fram-
ers. Giving Congress the power to declare war was a radical departure
from the sovereign monarch model," but the power was restricted to
"declaring" war, not "making it" as originally denominated in the draft
Constitution.57 Debate records indicate the change was intended to
nation of presidential powers:
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone
of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which
its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or qui-
escence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable if not invite, mea-
sures of independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of
power is likely to depend on the imperatives of the events and contemporary
imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.
Id.
52. A.D. SoFApR, supra note 49, at 5. The President could further argue that, as the
embodiment of the national sovereignty, he may exercise its rights under the law of na-
tions if there were no legislative direction to the contrary. Id.
53. See Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934, 936 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
54. A.D. SOFAER, supra note 49, at 4.
55. See Davi v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 478, 483 (W.D. Va. 1970). This political struggle
must continue if our foreign policy is to remain under effective democratic control. With
regard to all decisions relating to major and sustained hostilities, it should manifest itself
by means of continuous, albeit strenuous, consultation between Congress and the Presi-
dent. See Rostow, supra note 16, at 842.
56. E. CoRwIN, supra note 8, at 416 n.1. Locke, Blackstone and Montesquieu were in
accord with the standard practice that the king, as "executive," direct the course of for-
eign affairs, including the initiation and conduct of hostilities. Id.
57. Emerson, War Powers: An Invasion of Presidential Prerogative, 58 A.B.A. J. 809,
810 (Aug. 1971). The Framers were well aware that countries frequently engaged in hos-
tilities without a declaration of war. Yet they chose the word "declare," which had a
limited meaning at the time, rather than the word "make," which was then defined as
"to create" and "to bring into any state or condition." Id. The custom of engaging in
hostilities without any formal recognition of a state of war or belligerency continues,
perhaps with the hope of limiting hostilities and thereby diminishing the likelihood of
degenerating into a general nuclear war. Schindler, State o/ War, Belligerency, Armed
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give the President the power to introduce the military into hostilities
without prior consultation with the legislative branch.5 This was in
recognition of the President's superior ability to repel sudden attacks
while legislative deliberation could, under certain circumstances, jeop-
ardize the security of the country.5 ' Hamilton, writing as Lucius Cras-
sus, would put the whole conduct of war exclusively in the hands of the
President. 0 But it does not appear that the Framers intended for the
President to "make" undeclared war given that the Constitution gave
Congress control over those military actions short of formal war that
were in use at that time.s1 It is not possible to know the Framers' origi-
nal intent absolutely, but the principles that motivated them, viz., the
principles of democratic responsibility, the theory of checks and bal-
ances in the exercise of shared powers and civilian control of the mili-
tary, are still crucial to the continuance of a democratic society.' With
these key factors in mind, the Framers distributed the war powers in
such a way as to make them adaptable to changing world politics.6 5
This realistic approach has enabled the Constitution to endure
while the war powers have been allocated to those most able to com-
mand them." By 1836, John Qunicy Adams stated: "However startled
we may be at the idea that the Executive Chief Magistrate has the
power of involving the nation in war, even without consulting Con-
gress, an experience of fifty years has proved that in numberless cases
he has and must have exercised the power."6 5
As the independent and direct administrator of the international
rights and duties of the United States, the President has taken mili-
tary action based on his own interpretation of international law and
thereby aggrandized his powers.66 During the nineteenth century such
Conflict, in THE NEW HumNwrwru LAW OF ARMED Co icT 4 (A. Cassese ed. 1979). Of
all the armed conflicts since World War I, World War II has been the most notable
exception to this pattern. Id.
58. A.D. SOFABR, supra note 49, at 31.
59. Id. at 31-32. The framers clearly believed that the major weakness of the Articles
of Confederation was the absence of a strong, independent Executive and considered it a
paramount goal to cure this defect. Rostow, supra note 16, at 840-41.
60. THE FEDERALIST No. 73 (A. Hamilton).
61. A.D. SOFAER, supra note 49, at 4.
62. Rostow, supra note 16, at 843-45.
63. Id. at 841. The essence of the Constitution was not to bind a nation forever to a
particular foreign policy but, as indicated in McCulloch v. Maryland, 5 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316 (1819), to build a framework for a democracy that could last for ages regardless of
the vagaries of world circumstances. Id.
64. For a discussion of congressional ascendancy, see D. AaSHnw, supra note 8, chs. I
& IV.
65. Emerson, supra note 57, at 811.
66. E. CORWIN, supra note 8, at 196-97.
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actions were generally restricted to supressing piracy and slave trade,
pursuing of criminals across frontiers and protecting American lives
and property in areas where government had broken down.67 By the
twentieth century, the use of armed forces against sovereign nations
without authorization of Congress was commonly practiced.68 Although
experts differ as to exact numbers, among an estimated 201 incidents
of foreign hostilities involving the United States, only five were actu-
ally declared to be war by Congress, and more than half occured
outside the Western Hemisphere. ss
It was widely believed by the late 1940's that the President, in his
capacity as Commander in Chief, could use the armed forces as he saw
fit to carry out the broad foreign policy of the United States.7 0 Conse-
quently, the concept of congressional authorization of the presidential
power to use armed forces was dropped altogether in the Middle East
Resolution of 1957 ' the Cuba Resolution of 1962 7 and the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution 7  of 1964.74 Congress, focusing on the problems at
hand and the need to resolve them, accepted and supplemented the
67. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 415 (10th ed. 1980).
68. Id. Roosevelt, Taft and Wilson, building on the Executive's increase in power
during the nineteenth century, expanded the scope of presidential power by conducting
hostilities against sovereign states rather than against mere pirates or bandits, while
Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson held office at a time when the real power to
commit United States armed forces was wielded by the President as Commander in
Chief. See SEN. REP. No. 797, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1967).
69. Emerson, supra note 57, at 813. Various Presidents, including Monroe, sought to
buttress their actions by invoking a statute in partial justification of their use of armed
force, but frequently those statutes were only vaguely and imperfectly linked to the
event. Rostow, supra note 16, at 863.
70. G. GUNTHER, supra note 67, at 419. See also D. ABSHIRE, supra note 8, at 37.
When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the powers of the Commander in Chief were
expanded in a way that was unparalleled since Lincoln. Senator Taft complained that
Congress had become "a mere shell of a legislative body." Id. Somewhat later, President
Kennedy's announcement that the United States was "willing to defend freedom any-
where in the world" prepared the ideological framework for its involvement in the Viet-
nam war with the Commander-in-Chief as the instrument of the worldwide preservation
of democracy. Id. at 46. Despite this steady aggrandizement of war powers in the Execu-
tive, Congress never passed a law attempting to block or halt a presidentially authorized
hostility prior to the passage of the War Powers Resolution in 1973. Emerson, supra note
57, at 813.
71. Middle East Resolution, Pub. L. No. 85-87, 71 Stat. 5 (1957), amended by Pub. L.
No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (1961).
72. Cuba Resolution, Pub. L. No. 87-733, 76 Stat. 697 (1962).
73. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964).
74. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 67, at 415-16. The language used implied that the
President already had the power to employ the armed forces as proposed in the resolu-
tion and that Congress was merely expressing its sentiments of national unity and sup-
port. Id.
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substantial body of precedent that justified Presidential initiative even
when that initiative threatened to bring about major warfare.7"
By the late 1960's, however, growing hostility towards this pattern
of presidential initiative and ex post facto congressional acquiesence
marked the beginning of the end of the Commander in Chiefs power
to command at will, unfettered by the assertion of the will of Con-
gress. 6 This situation was largely precipitated by the President's com-
mitment of American troops to combat in Viet Nam, an action that
involved the United States in major and increasingly unpopular war-
fare.7 7 As a result, the country found itself in the midst of a critical
foreign policy crisis7 8 compounded by a crisis of trust in the Presi-
dent 79 that culminated in the passage, over President Nixon's veto, of
the War Powers Resolution of 1973.81
WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
The War Powers Resolution represents an attempt by Congress to
reduce what it regarded as the disproportionate presidential exercise of
the use of force, by maximizing congressional control over United
States military activity."
Section 2(a) of the Resolution provides:
It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of
75. Id.
76. D. ABSHIRE. supra note 8, at 47. Congress began to curtail presidential authority
to commit armed forces to combat by changing its policy from rubber stamping appro-
priation requests to restricting military and security operations by effectively exercising
the power of the purse. Id. at 58.
77. King & Leavens, supra note 40, at 55. See also D. ABSHIRE, supra note 8, at 47.
Abshire discusses how others pinpoint the deterioration of the President's power in 1965
when Johnson sent 22,000 troops into the Dominican Republic without prior congres-
sional consultation. As the United States became more deeply involved in Vietnam,
Americans watched nightly as the horrors of war were graphically televised. At the same
time, public attention focused on "The Hill" as unprecedented legislative debates raged
over the proper allocations of war powers. Id. at 47, 53.
78. Rostow, supra note 16, at 897. See also D. ABSHIRE supra note 8, at 53-54. As
popular faith in the Vietnam crusade flagged, anti-war forces in the Senate moved with
greater momentum. The Senate Foreign Relations Commitee Hearings signaled a new
epoch of constraints on the President. Id.
79. D. ABSHIRE, supra note 8, at 55. Regardless of the fact that trust in the President
in foreign affairs was undermined during the Johnson administration and despite the
massive efforts of Congress and anti-war forces to shift the balance of power over foreign
affairs out of the President's hands, it was not until 1973, when United States troops
were already out of Vietnam, that the tide seriously turned against the President as the
result of critical Watergate revelations. Id. at 53.
80. 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1973).
81. King & Leavens, supra note 40, at 76, 77.
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the Framers of the Constitution of the United States and in-
sure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the
President will apply to the introduction of the United States
Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where immi-
nent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the cir-
cumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostili-
ties or in such situations.6 2
Although the terms "hostilities" and "situations where imminent in-
volvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances" are
not defined in the Resolution itself, the legislative history indicates
that these terms are meant to signify all military activity involving
even a "clear potential" for a "state of confrontation in which there is
a clear and present danger of armed conflict."83 Military activity de-
scribed in such broad terms would certainly encompass a blockade
against Cuba, since the potential for armed conflict under such circum-
stances is clear.
Section 2(c) provides:
The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-
Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities,
or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pur-
suant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authori-
zation, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the
United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed
forces."
These severe restrictions on the President's authority to use force short
of war pose serious constitutional questions.8 5 They are arguably in
contravention of the Framers' intent, 6 incontrovertibly opposed to
years of precedent8 7 and rebutted by the few judicial decisions that
have been handed down on the subject.88
82. War Powers Resolution, supra note 4, § 2(a).
83. King & Leavens, supra note 40, at 78.
84. War Powers Resolution, supra note 4, § 2(c).
85. King & Leavens, supra note 40, at 80.
86. See Rostow, supra note 16, at 840-44.
87. Corwin observes that "dozens and scores of episodes have occurred in our history
in which Presidents have done this very thing." E. CoRwIN, supra note 8, at 198.
88. In Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 37 (1800), Justice Chase noted that although
Congress is empowered to declare a general war, Congress may wage a limited war that
requires no such declaration. Id. at 43. Justice Marshall later confirmed that hostilities
could be authorized by means other than a declaration of war. In Talbot v. Seeman, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 27-29 (1801). Cases brought in reaction to the Vietnam war have held
[Vol. 3
PRESIDENTIAL BLOCKADE OF CUBA
A rare court consideration of the executive's power to deploy
armed forces arose in the Prize Cases s" which stemmed from the
blockade of Southern ports declared in 1861 by President Lincoln
without a congressional declaration of war. The Court allowed that:
If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the Presi-
dent is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force.
He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the chal-
lenge without waiting for any special legislative authority. And
whether the hostile party be a foreign invader, or states organ-
ized in rebellion, it is none the less a war though the declara-
tion of it be "unilateral.".
Whether the President . . . has met with such armed hos-
tile resistance . . . as will compel him to accord to them the
character of belligerents, is a question to be decided by him,
and this Court must be governed by the decisions and acts of
the political department of the Government to which this
power was entrusted. 0
The Court thus acknowledged the authority of the President to declare
a blockade, even in advance of congressional authorization, based on
his own determination that the gravity of the situation requires it.9'1
Any congressional attempt to limit that power by an exhaustive enu-
meration of what constitutes a national emergency would therefore be
unconstitutional' 2 and impermissibly tie the President's hands in an
that the President may take the initiative to introduce American forces into hostilities
without congressional approval when a grave emergency exists. See, e.g., Mitchell v.
Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 613-14 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
89. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
90. Id. at 668, 670 (emphasis in original).
91. Id. at 670.
92. See Rostow, supra note 16, at 896. King & Leavens, supra note 40, at 78 suggest
that:
[Wjithin our recent history, President Eisenhower's deployment of troops to
Lebanon, President Kennedy's blockade of Cuba, President Johnson's deploy-
ment of troops to the Dominican Republic as well as the initial advisory activity
in Viet Nam and President Nixon's activities in Cambodia would have all fallen
within the broad coverage of the War Powers Resolution, and thus subject to
congressional control.
Id. Abshire states that, "President Ford partially implemented the Resolution four times
in 1975 by reporting to Congress about actions taken in connection with the evacuation
of the United States and foreign nations from Vietnam and the rescue of the Mayaguez."
D. ABSHIRE, supra note 8, at 55.
The report to Congress on the Mayaguez incident concluded that "Itihe operation
was conducted pursuant to the President's constitutional power and his authority as
1982]
N.Y.J. INT'L & Coup. L.
age when the President must act quickly, and often alone, to preserve
the nation's security.9
3
Despite the foregoing, sections 2(a) and 2(c) of the War Powers
Resolution must be read to assert that President Reagan may not con-
stitutionally institute a blockade against Cuba to stop the flow of arms
to El Salvador absent a congressional declaration of war, unless such
action falls within one of the narrow exceptions contained in sections
2(c)(2) and 2(c)(3)."
With respect to a future blockade against Cuba, the Inter-Ameri-
can Reciprocal Assistance Treaty, 5 commonly known as the Rio
Treaty, and the Cuba Resolution" should be considered for their ap-
plicability under section 2(c)(2). Both were enacted prior to the War
Powers Resolution and both seem to empower the President to make
war without further congressional authorization. 9 7 The Cuba Resolu-
tion specifically states that the United States is determined to prevent
any Cuban aggression in the Western Hemisphere "by whatever means
necessary, including the use of arms.""8 The Rio Treaty, a multilateral
mutual defense treaty signed by both the United States and El Salva-
dor, provides in article 3 that:
[Ain armed attack by any State against an American State
shall be considered as an attack against all American States
and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties un-
dertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recog-
nized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations."
The terms of these two enactments indicate a clear intent to con-
Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces." G. GUNTHER, supra note 67,
at 416. Finally, in 1980, President Carter argued that, "the failed attempt to rescue the
American hostages held in Iran was not subject to the War Powers Resolution because it
constituted a humanitarian effort." Id.
93. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also Rostow,
supra note 16, at 896. Particularly in the circumstances of modern life, it is imperative
that the President have the diplomatic power to make a credible threat to use force in
order to deter a confrontation which might escalate. Id.
94. See supra text accompanying note 84.
95. Rio Treaty, supra note 6.
96. Cuba Resolution, supra note 72.
97. The Cuba Resolution, supra note 72, passed less than a month before Kennedy's
quarantine of Cuba, states "[tihat the United States is determined . . .to prevent by
whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist re-
gime in Cuba from extending, by force or threat of force, its aggressive or subversive
activites to any part of this hemisphere."
98. Cuba Resolution, supra note 72, cl.(a).
99. Rio Treaty, supra note 6, art. 3.
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fer war making power upon the President. The interpretative provi-
sions of the War Powers Resolution, sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(2), how-
ever, interpret the Resolution as requiring more before these
documents can be given the effect intended at the time they were
signed. 00 Thus, the Cuba Resolution would fail as justification for a
blockade against Cuba since section 8(a)(1) interprets the "specific
statutory authorization" provision of section 2(c)(2) of the War Powers
Resolution to require that the legislation not only be specific, but also
that it explicitly refer to the War Powers Resolution. 0 ' The Cuba Res-
olution fails to meet the second part of this two-pronged test.
The Rio Treaty must undergo a similar analysis. Section 8(a)(2) of
the War Powers Resolution requires that the treaty be implemented by
legislation that specifically authorizes the use of armed force and, if it
is to confer war-making powers, refer explicitly to the War Powers
Resolution.'0 " The Rio Treaty also fails to meet the second part of the
test. It may still serve, however, as a basis for a legitimate blockade
under the terms of the War Powers Resolution since section 8(d)(1)
states that the Resolution is not intended to alter the provisions of
existing treaties. s0 3 As such, the Rio Treaty, which authorized war-
100. War Powers Resolution, supra note 4. Section 8(a) of the War Powers Resolu-
tion states that:
Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situa-
tions wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances
shall not be inferred-
(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before the date of the
enactment of this joint resolution), including any provision contained in any ap-
propriation Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes the introduction of
United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and states
that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the
meaning of this joint resolution; or
(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is
implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of the
United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and stating
that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the
meaning of this joint resolution.
Id. (emphasis added).
101. There may be some sort of general latitude here since it is not clear from the
language or the legislative history of the War Powers Resolution just how specific the
"specific statutory authorization" must be. Regardless of how specific the statutory au-
thorization is, it will not contain a reference to the War Powers Resolution if enacted
prior to it. King & Leavens, supra note 40, at 93.
102. This provision was to ensure that the House of Representatives participated in
the authorization process and that the grants of authority to make war in the treaties
indicated the same clear intent as similar grants in legislation. King & Leavens, supra
note 40, at 94.
103. War Powers Resolution, supra note 4, § 8(d)(1).
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making by the President prior to the Resolution, should be unaffected
by the implementing legislation and specific authorization require-
ments of section 8(a)(2).
10 4
Under section 2(c)(3) of the War Powers Resolution, the President
may employ armed force when a national emergency is created by an
attack on the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed
forces. Under the terms of the Rio Treaty, an attack on El Salvador is
to be considered as an attack on the United States.10 5 If this treaty is
to be given effect under section 8(a)(2), then section 2(c)(3) may also
be operative and give further support to the President's right to act. If
the treaty is denied effect under section 8(a)(2) the President might
still lay claim to a section 2(c)(3) exception. The Resolution does not
require that the attack on the United States be a direct and armed
one, but only that the attack create a national emergency.'"s The integ-
rity of El Salvador and of the whole of the American continents has
historically been regarded as of the utmost importance to the security
of the United States. 10 7 Support for this can be found in the admoni-
tions of the Monroe Doctrine that the Western hemisphere is to be free
from colonization.108 This idea is also forcefully expressed in the Rio
Treaty109 and the Cuba Resolution.110 A successful Soviet-backed coup
in Central America would greatly enhance Russia's strategic position
against the United States.1 Should the machinations of the Soviet
Bloc alleged by the Reagan Administration prove a sufficiently serious
threat to the political independence and sovereignty of El Salvador, 1
104. There are some who claim that no existing United States treaties empower the
President to make war without further authorization from Congress. Therefore, the War
Powers Resolution's implementing legislation and specific authorization requirements
leave existing treaties intact. See, e.g., King & Leavens, supra note 40, at 94. For the
view that the President was already authorized to use force as proposed, see Rostow,
supra note 16, at 839-40 n.12. See also G. GUNTHER, supra note 67, at 420.
105. Rio Treaty, supra note 6, art. 3.
106. War Powers Resolution, supra note 4, § 2(c).
107. McDougal, supra note 9, at 601.
108. Monroe Doctrine (Am. State Papers, Class 1; Foreign Relations. 15th through
19th Cong., Ist Sess., CIS Serial Set, No. 5, Fiche 4, 1897). The Monroe Doctrine was
inspired, at least in part, by the struggle of the South American states for independence.
C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 170 (2d ed. 1934). More importantly, the need to pre-
vent hostile powers from entering the Western Hemisphere was considered a question of
urgent self-defense. Hence, the need for increased defensive armaments and possibly
conflicting alliances. Id.
109. Rio Treaty, supra note 6, arts. 3, 8.
110. Cuba Resolution, supra note 72, cl.(a).
111. McDougal, supra note 9, at 601.
112. Thus far, direct military intervention in El Salvador has not been considered
necessary, but the United States has been steadily increasing military and economic aid
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the President would be justified in claiming a state of national emer-
gency. One may conclude, therefore, that even if the War Powers Reso-
lution were found constitutional, under certain circumstances the Pres-
ident would have the authority to lawfully institute a blockade without
prior congressional authorization.
While the President has more power to control the use of the
armed forces than a cursory reading of the War Powers Resolution
would indicate, any President would be ill-advised to proceed in disre-
gard of the opinion of his co-equal branch."' In circumstances such as
those alleged to exist in El Salvador, the closest collaboration should
prevail in that "constitutional pattern of enforced cooperation between
President and Congress, for all the friction it inevitably generates." ""
Should the President thereafter insist on a course that is anathema to
Congress, it could close its purse or even consider impeachment.'
Recent Presidents who have not listened to the voice of public opinion
have paid a high price." 7 While bearing these real political limitations
in mind, the words of Justice Jackson should be recalled:
We should not use this occasion to "circumscribe", much less
to contract, the lawful role of the President as Commander-in-
Chief. I should indulge the widest latitude of interpretation to
sustain his exclusive function to command the instruments of
national force, at least when turned against the outside world
for the security of our society. s
to that country. The United States is also backing free elections in El Salvador in an
attempt to undermine support for the revolutionaries. Mullin, supra note 1, at 25.
113. Rostow, supra note 16, at 842. Neither the President nor the Congress can carry
out a successful foreign policy unless, in fact, they work together. Id.
114. Id. The great advantage of such a course is the stimulation of public discussion
of all the issues involved and the checking and questioning of the President's judgment
by independent critics. See McDougal & Lans, supra note 27, at 556.
115. This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and
effective weapon bestowed on the immediate representative of the people by the Consti-
tution, and by which means they may obtain redress for every grievance and carry into
effect every just and salutory measure. THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 377 (A. Hamilton or J.
Madison). The effectiveness of such action is evidenced by events in our recent history.
Direct United States participation in the Indochina War was ended on May 31, 1973
when the Senate voted to cut off all appropriations to Laos and Cambodia. D. ABsHsR,
supra note 8, at 55. This method for overriding executive use of military force has been
recognized by the courts as both effective, valid and controlling. See Drinan v. Nixon,
364 F. Supp. 854 (D. Mass. 1973).
116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
117. Divisiveness over the war in Vietnam toppled one President and created difficul-
ties for another, at least partly because public opinion was not really considered. Berger,
supra note 7, at 57 n.305.
118. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 645 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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THE LEGALITY OF A BLOCKADE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
May the United States lawfully impose a blockade against Cuba
premised on the circumstances in El Salvador as alleged by President
Reagan? 119
When Russia attempted to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba
in 1962, President Kennedy, without prior authorization of the United
Nations Security Council, responded by ordering a limited naval opera-
tion designed solely to prevent further Soviet strategic buildup.""0
Careful not to imply a state of war or belligerency, President Kennedy
referred to this military action as a defensive quarantine 21 and
grounded its justification on two legal structures of major world impor-
tance: the Rio Treaty of 1947 and the Charter of the United Nations. 22
These same structures, as well as the rights of self-defense as recog-
nized by traditional international law, invite consideration in deter-
mining the legality of any similar presidential action that may be pro-
posed in the future.
I. THE Rio TREATY
Signed at a time when countries around the world were acutely
aware of the need for unity in order to effectively check the spread of
communism,113 all the American Republics, including Cuba, joined to-
gether in the Rio Treaty "to assure peace, through adequate means, to
provide for effective reciprocal assistance to meet armed attacks
against any American state and . .. deal with threats of aggression
119. See infra notes 236-41 and accompanying text.
120. Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 515, 524 (1963).
121. Id. at 515.
122. Id. at 516. There is some disagreement as to whether the Cuba Resolution was a
satisfactory basis for Kennedy's quarantine during the Missile Crisis of 1962. See Ros-
tow, supra note 16, at 840 n.12. Although clause (a) of the Cuba Resolution authorized
the President to use force if necessary to prevent Cuba from expanding its influence to
any part of the hemisphere by the use or threat of force (and might, therefore, indicate a
basis for a blockade under the circumstances existing in El Salvador), it did not mention
the use of arms when announcing the United State's determination to prevent the crea-
tion or use of an externally supported military capability in Cuba that endangered the
peace and security of the United States. For this reason, it is better to disregard the
Cuba Resolution as a basis for Kennedy's action. Id.
123. The Russians in Eastern Europe at the close of World War II, the fall of Nation-
alist China, the Czechoslovakian coup in 1948, the attack on South Korea and the fear of
expansion by Communist China into Southeast Asia, and the increased concern over se-
curity from communist takeovers in the United States, Europe and Southeast Asian
countries led to eight such treaties involving 43 nations. Rostow, supra note 16, at 878.
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against any of them." 2 4
As discussed earlier in connection with the War Powers Resolu-
tion,12 5 article 3, paragraph 1 of the Rio Treaty grants the parties to
the treaty the authority to exercise their inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense by meeting an armed attack against any of the
treaty signatories. 1 2 This right to self-defense has, arguably, been acti-
vated by the activities of Cuba in El Salvador.
2 7
Article 3, paragraph 2, provides in part: "On request of the State
or States directly attacked . . . each one of the Contracting Parties
may determine the immediate measures which it may individually take
in fulfillment of the obligation contained in the preceeding paragraph
and in accordance with the principle of continental solidarity. .. .
The United States has issued warnings that it will consider insti-
tuting a blockade against Cuba if the funneling of arms or the commu-
nist provoked state of attack continues.12 9 El Salvador, however, has
not been, and may not be, inclined in the future to request such mili-
tary aid.' 30
Although paragraph 2 of the Rio Treaty reads, "[o]n the request of
the State . . . directly attacked," "on request" should not be read as
"on request and only on request." " ' The underlying purpose of the
treaty indicates that paragraph 2 should be read together with para-
graph 1 of the same article which states that "an armed attack . . .
against one American State shall be considered as an armed attacked
against all the American States .... ,,i-2 This provision recognizes the
interdependent nature of the security of the American countries and
124. Rio Treaty, supra note 6, 62 Stat. at 1699, 1700.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 94-105.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
127. See infra text accompanying notes 234-41.
128. Rio Treaty, supra note 6, art. 3, para. 2, 62 Stat. at 1700.
129. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
130. The possibility of excessive United States intervention in Latin America has al-
ways been a concern of Latin American countries. See J. HOUSTON, LATIN AMERICA IN
THE UNITED NATIONS 112 (1956).
131. See M. McDoUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
237 n.261 (1961).
A proposition that 'if A, then B' is not equivalent to, and does not necessa-
rily imply the proposition that 'if, and only if, A, then B.' To read one proposi-
tion for the other, or to imply the latter from the former, may be the result of a
policy choice, conscious or otherwise, or of innocent reliance upon the question-
begging Latinism inclusio exclusio alterius; such identification or implication is
assuredly not a compulsion of logic. If a policy choice is in fact made, it should
be articulated as to permit its assessment.
Id. (emphasis in original).
132. Rio Treaty, supra note 6, art. 3, para. 1, 62 Stat. at 1700.
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the need for the right of collective self-defense.13 3 Consequently, an at-
tack on El Salvador may be construed as an attack on the United
States. When the United States is under such an attack, the President
should not be restrained from exercising this right of self-defense until
El Salvador requests him to act. Such restraints could seriously impede
a quick and effective solution. Further, the existence of restraints is
contraindicated by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,
which recognizes the need for a state to act quickly and on its own
initiative when the necessity arises."
This interpretation is further supported by article 6 of the treaty.
Article 6 provides for collective action through the Organ of Consulta-
tion to determine the appropriate response to an unarmed attack
which threatens the integrity or inviolability or political independence
or sovereignty of any American state. " This response is to be deter-
mined irrespective of the target state's request if two-thirds of the sig-
natory states who have ratified the treaty agree.3 ' If a resolution rec-
ommending action on the Salvadoran problem were to issue by such a
process, it would provide an alternative basis for President Reagan's
authority to act in advance of any request by El Salvador. "' It may be
reasonably inferred from these observations that effective defensive
measures to preserve the American States are not to be foregone in the
absence of a formal request by the target state. It is conceivable that
the target state could be paralyzed by internal conflict or otherwise be
unable or unwilling to act in the best interests of the American States
as a whole.
Should outside aggressors against El Salvador discontinue their
armed attack, but continue as a viable threat within the contemplation
of article 6, a lawful blockade is still possible. Under article 8, the "use
of armed force" is explicitly included among the possible appropriate
responses that the Organ of Consultation may recommend."' President
Kennedy's 1962 action provides an excellent example of how this may
be accomplished.
133. See J. HOUSTON, supra note 130, at 9.
134. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
135. Rio Treaty, supra note 6, art. 6, 62 Stat. at 1701.
136. "The Organ of Consultation shall make its decisions by a vote of two-thirds of
the signatory states which have ratified the treaty." Rio Treaty, supra note 6, art. 6, 62
Stat. at 1700.
137. Article 6 expressly provides that, when so warranted, the Organ of Consultation
shall meet immediately to determine what measures are necessary to assist the victim of
the aggression "or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common
defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent." Rio
Treaty, supra note 6, art. 6, 62 Stat. at 1701.
138. Rio Treaty, supra note 6, art. 8, 62 Stat. at 1701.
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After repeated acknowledgements that Soviet intervention in
Cuba was posing threats to the American States, the Provisional Organ
of Consultation met informally on October 23, 1962. After considera-
tion of the evidence of the secret introduction of Soviet strategic mis-
siles into Cuba, it concluded that it was confronted with a situation
that might, within the meaning of article 6,189 endanger the peace of
the American States. The Organ issued a resolution recommending
that the individual and member states use whatever force necessary,
including armed force, to prevent the missiles in Cuba from becoming
an active threat to the peace and security of the continent. 40 The
United States government interpreted this resolution, formulated in
accordance with articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty, as a clear authoriza-
tion of the defensive quarantine of Cuba.""
The Rio Treaty, therefore, offers two possible methods by which
President Reagan might execute his threat, should the facts warrant it:
(1) independently, based on the fact of armed attack, via article 3; and
(2) through the collective action of the Organ of Consultation via arti-
cle 6.
THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
Would a blockade based on article 3 of the Rio Treaty conform to
the requirements of the United Nations Charter?
A central purpose of the United Nations is to maintain world
peace, through collective efforts, by suppressing both actual acts of ag-
gression and threats to international security. 4" Article 52(1) of the
United Nations Charter explicitly recognizes regional organizations
and assigns them a prominent role in implementing this purpose.1
48
This article provides:
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of re-
gional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters
relating to the maintenance of international peace and security
as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such ar-
rangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. 4'
That the Rio Treaty and its activities are consistent with the pur-
139. See Meeker, supra note 120, at 517.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 518.
142. U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
143. See A. RiwAAT, INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION 193 (1979).
144. U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 1.
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poses and principles of the United Nations is generally accepted."5
When the framers of the Charter met in San Francisco in 1945, collec-
tive security systems at the regional level had already been estab-
lished.146 But the goal of harmonizing "regionalism" with "universal-
ity" grew out of the great determination of the Latin American
participants to assure a large degree of autonomy for the Inter-Ameri-
can system as proposed by the Act of Chapultepec. 47 This Act recom-
mended the conclusion of a treaty to create a regional arrangement and
specifically stated that the "use of armed force to prevent or repel ag-
gression" was "regional action which might appropriately be taken by
regional arrangements."""
Judging from the debates of the framers of the Charter, article 52
was approved in order to accommodate this particular regional ar-
rangement as envisioned by the Act of Chapultepec and as later cre-
ated by means of the Rio Treaty. "1 9 It is thus reasonable to conclude
145. See Meeker, supra note 120, at 519.
146. See A. RIFAAT, supra note 143, at 193. Before the Framers of the Charter of the
United Nations met in San Francisco in 1945, the Conference of the American Republics
had already approved the Act of Chapultepec which outlined the most significant re-
gional arrangement to date, viz., the Inter-American system. See Meeker, supra note
120, at 518.
147. J. HOUSTON, supra note 130, at 47. The dramatic shift in the balance of power
following World War II, particularly the sudden increase in power wielded by the Soviet
Union, was a great source of alarm to the Latin American countries. Id. at 15. The Latin
Americans already considered the growing infiltration of National Socialism and Fascism
a menace by the late thirties with the result that the Monroe Doctrine was revived and
cooperative self-defense was considered priority business at conferences in Mexico City
and Havana. U. SCHWARZ, CONFRONTRATION AND INTERVENTION IN THE MODERN WORLD
162 (1970). Convinced wholeheartedly that the threat to the security of the world, as well
as to their own security, emanated from Russia and not the West, they sought to protect
themselves by strengthening the familiar structure of their own regional security system.
J. HOUSTON, supra note 130, at 15.
148. Meeker, supra note 120, at 518. When the framers debated the issue of regional
organization, it was this inter-American system that served as the principal context for
the discussions. Id.
149. At the time article 52 was being debated in San Francisco, the Chairman of the
committee to consider regional arrangements made the statement that:
The Act of Chapultepec provides for the collective defense of the hemisphere
and establishes that if an American nation is attacked all the rest consider them-
selves attacked. Consequently, such action as they may take to repel aggression,
authorized by the article which was discussed by the sub-committee yesterday, is
legitimate for all of them. Such action would be in accord with the charter, by
approval of the article, and a regional arrangement may take action, provided it
does not have improper purposes, as for example joint aggression against an-
other state. From this, it may be deduced that the approval of this article im-
plies that the Act of Chapultepec is not in contravention of the Charter.
Id. When the Rio Treaty was concluded, it incorporated into its terms the purposes and
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that the purposes and activities of the regional agency created by the
Rio Treaty are within the purposes and principles of the United
Nations.50
Article 2, paragraph 4, is the Charter limitation on the threat or
use of force when inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter of the
United Nations."' The only kind of war conducted by individual states
that is cognizable under the United Nations Charter is a war of self-
defense.58 Unprovoked armed attacks are proscribed by this article
and constitute a violation of international law.15 3 A necessary blockade
in defense of such aggression, designed solely to restore international
security and to prevent further unwarranted attack, would, however,
be wholly consistent with the major purpose of the United Nations,
which is to minimize unauthorized violence and coercion across state
lines. 5 For this reason, President Reagan's proposed blockade, al-
though itself a threat and a potential use of force, would not be subject
to the constraints of article 2(4) if it were, in fact, both necessary and
properly delimited. 5 5 Article 51 supports this interpretation by explic-
itly recognizing that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a member of the United Nations."
15s
Although Cuba has been charged with armed aggression against El
Salvador,15 7 just what constitutes aggression has been difficult to dis-
cern. The expression "armed attack" demonstrates the same stubborn
the exact language of the Act of Chapultepec. Id.
150. U. SCHWARZ, supra note 147, at 175.
151. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 states that: "All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independency of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the United Nations."
152. Schindler, supra note 57, at 5.
153. Id.
154. See McDougal, supra, note 9, at 600-01.
155. See Meeker, supra, note 120, at 523.
156. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. The text of that article states that
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to main-
tain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exer-
cise of the right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council and shall not in any way effect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Id.
157. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1981, at A8, col. 5.
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resistance to being categorized. 5 8 In San Francisco, attempts by the
framers to define aggression were discontinued after much debate and
little agreement.'8 9 Delegates considered indirect aggression to be the
most dangerous type of aggression and were, therefore, fearful of creat-
ing a definition that might later be regarded as exclusive of unforeseen
circumstances. s0 Instead, the framers gave the Security Council, under
article 39, the authority to determine whether aggression had occurred
and what responses would be appropriate.' 6 '
This has proved to be an unhappy solution' since, under article
27 of the Charter, each of the permanent members of the Security
Council may, by its single vote, override any decision reached by the
majority of the other members.6 8 Consequently, a veto can, and has,
facilitated the destruction of the independent governmental life of a
nation by blocking Security Council action when most desperately
needed.' Faced with this reality, the futility of requiring the Security
Council to determine an aggressor in the Salvadoran situation by
means of article 39 is apparent. 6 5
This quandry does not leave the United States without lawful re-
course. Despite the absence of formal guidelines, under article 51 the
determination of an armed attack belongs, in the first instance, to the
target state until the Security Council takes steps to restore interna-
tional peace and security.'6 6
158. A. RiPAAT, supra note 143, at 124-25.
159. Id.
160. Id. Panama proposed that aggression be defined as
the threat of force by a state or government against another state, in any man-
ner, whatever the weapons employed and whether openly or otherwise, for any
reason or purpose other than individual or collective self-defense in pursuance of
a decision or recommendation by a competent organ of the United Nations.
J. HOUSTON, supra note 130, at 151-52. The other Latin American countries, with the
sole exception of Mexico, opposed this definition as dangerously restrictive. Id. The Rio
Treaty provides an open-ended definition of aggression in article 9 which includes as
non-exclusive examples of aggressive situations involving improved armed attacks and
armed invasions. Rio Treaty, supra note 6, art. 9. The characteristics which distinguish
such attacks or invasions, however, are not illuminated either in article 9 or elsewhere in
the treaty.
161. A. RIFAAT, supra note 143, at 122.
162. See id.
163. U.N. CHARTER art. 27.
164. A. RIFAAT, supra note 143, at 220. This is evidenced, for example, by the facts of
the Czechoslovakian coup d'etat in 1948, when the Soviet veto prevented the Security
Council from investigating charges that the coup was only successful because of the
threat of the use of force by Russia, whose troops were standing ready for action on the
north-west boundaries of Czechoslavakia. Id.
165. Id. at 123.
166. Id. at 125. The competence to make such a determination must be conceded at
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This condonation of provisional autointerpretation in no way pre-
cludes a state's unilateral decision from being reviewed by the interna-
tional community for its adherence to the requirements of necessity
and proportionality."'7 When later judging a state's determination that
an armed attack has occurred, however, certain critical changes in ag-
gressive techniques must be borne in mind.'
In order to maintain a formal compliance with the United Nations'
obligation to abstain from illegal force, while at the same time pursuing
their former national policies, certain states have developed sophisti-
cated methods of covert or indirect aggression.' By means of subver-
sion, fomenting civil strife, sending irregulars to assist armed rebel
groups in the target state or aiding armed bands, the independent exis-
tence of a state can be crushed as effectively as by the classical means
of external aggression. 1 0 Various instruments issuing from the United
Nations condemning indirect aggression have supported this conclu-
sion that the traditional concepts of aggression and armed attack must
be expanded.
17 '
When one state has taken positive action against another state
through the use of armed force, an act of aggression may be said to
have occurred,7 2 regardless of whether this action was taken directly,
or indirectly by means of giving aid to armed bands planning invasion
or attack. 73 If the attack is of such a serious nature that it threatens
the inviolability of the target state, it qualifies as an "armed attack.' ' 7
These criteria are useful in determining whether an armed attack
least until we have attained a more viable world public order. See M. McDOUGAL & F.
FELICIANO, supra note 131, at 218.
167. McDougal, supra note 9, at 599. Necessity requires that military responses made
in self-defense "should be limited to initiating coercion that is so intense as to have
created in the target state reasonable expectations ... that a military action was indis-
pensibly necessary to protect such consequential bases of power as 'territorial integrity'
and 'political independence.'" M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 131, at 259.
Proportionality requires that the responding states use of force does not exceed the in-
tensity and magnitude reasonably necessary to promptly effect its self-defense. McDou-
gal, supra note 9, at 598.
168. See A. RIFAAT, supra note 143, at 217.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 217-18.
171. U. SCHWARZ, supra note 147, at 175.
172. See A. RIFAAT, supra note 143, at 118.
173. Id. at 64.
174. Id. at 125. Some commentators have argued that subversive intervention by
means of infiltration or propaganda and supplying arms cannot be answered by force.
See Wright, United States Intervention in Lebanon, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 878 (1947). Other
scholars have interpreted article 51 to give the right of self-defense a broader scope. See
M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 131, at 235.
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threatening the security and inviolabilty of El Salvador has been
launched by Cuba. If it has, the foregoing analysis leads to the conclu-
sion that the institution of a defensive blockade, legal under the terms
of article 3 of the Rio Treaty, would not contravene the relevant provi-
sions of the United Nations Charter.
Further provisions must be considered to determine if, under the
Charter, President Reagan could base his actions on the recommenda-
tions of the Organ of Consultation issued in accordance with article 6
of the Rio Treaty. Article 6 is the provision relevant to situations in-
volving unarmed attacks which, according to article 8 of the Rio
Treaty, may be rebuffed by the use of armed force. 7 '
It should be noted here that the Charter of the United Nations
specifically recognized and preserved the traditional, customary right
of self-defense 17 6 through the unanimous approval and adoption of ar-
ticle 51.177 Under traditional international law principles, acts of self-
defense were cognizable in situations that posed threats to the political
independence or territorial integrity of a state, independent of actual
armed attacks. 17 These rights have in no way been limited by the in-
sertion of article 51 into the Charter of the United Nations. 79 On the
contrary, it was the intent of the framers to preserve and safeguard
these traditional rights.180 Committee reports, approved by both Com-
mission I and the Plenary Conference, stressed that the use of armed
force in legitimate self-defense was accepted and unimparied by the
Charter.' s ' That article 2(4) refers explicitly to both the threat and the
use of force as impermissible coercion, as well as other coercive mea-
sures inconsistent with the purpose of the Charter, also supports a
reading of article 51 that gives states an equally comprehensive right to
defend themselves against such action.182 The subsequent conduct by
the parties to the agreement, and official utterances most relevant to
the subject, confirm this interpretation.8 "
It appears that the motivation for the hotly debated language of
article 5118 " was only to allay the fears of the Latin American states
that their regional enforcement system could be paralyzed by the arbi-
175. Rio Treaty, supra note 6, arts. 6, 8.
176. See McDougal, supra note 9, at 599.
177. J. HOUSTON, supra note 130, at 49.
178. C. FENWICK, supra note 108, at 164.
179. McDougal, supra note 9, at 599.
180. M. McDoUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 131, at 235.
181. Id. at 235-36.
182. McDougal, supra note 9, at 600.
183. Id.
184. For the view that article 51 is limited in scope to situations involving "actual
Armed attack", see Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546, 560 (1963).
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trary exercise of a Security Council veto.185 Precisely by admitting
unimpaired the traditional right of individual and collective self-de-
fense, article 51 provided the formula necessary to reconcile a global
security system with the Inter-American system.18s At the same time it
neutralized the threat of the veto to the satisfaction of those delegates
who expressed the greatest concern over the dangerous character of
covert methods of aggression.""7
It may be recalled that even though President Kennedy had ade-
quate grounds to justify his quarantine against Cuba as a self-defense
measure within the contemplation of article 51, he chose instead to
base it solely on the collective judgment and recommendations of the
Organ of Consultation executed in conformity with the demands of the
United Nations. s Under the appropriate circumstances, President
Reagan could adopt a similar course of action.
Article 54 requires that regional agencies, such as the one in ques-
tion, keep the Security Council fully informed of activities undertaken
or contemplated for the maintenance of international peace and secur-
ity.1 To this end, in 1962 the Organ of Consultation directed the con-
tents of the October twenty-third resolution be made known to the Se-
curity Council.190 Similar reporting should be made in the event that
the recently threatened blockade becomes a reality.
Article 53 is somewhat more problematic. It states in part: "The
Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional ar-
rangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But
no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or
by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security
Council." 191
When this article was approved, it was intended that the Security
Council would assume primary responsibility for the effective settle-
ment of international crises on behalf of the members of the United
185. According to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, section C of chapter VIII recog-
nized regional agencies and their role with respect to regional action, but forbade them
from taking defensive measures until authorized by the Security Council. J. HOUSTON,
supra note 130, at 47. Latin Americans, greatly concerned that the veto could stymie
action by their regional agency and the Council itself, brought great pressure to bear on
the United States delegation to circumvent this outcome. Id. at 49. Their efforts paid off
in the formulation of article 51, designed specifically to accommodate the inter-American
system as envisaged by the Act of Chapultepec. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 151-52.
188. Meeker, supra note 120, at 523.
189. U.N. CHARTER, art. 54.
190. Meeker, supra note 120, at 518.
191. U.N. CHARTER, art. 53, para. 1.
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Nations.0 2 Experience has made it clear that the Security Council is
incapable of fulfilling this function of maintaining world peace and se-
curity.18 To enforce this provision in view of these shortcomings would
defeat the major purposes and demands of the international commu-
nity, deny threatened countries effective recourse to self-defense, and
force them "to assume the posture of 'sitting ducks.' ""'
To avoid this intolerable result, article 53 can no longer be read to
preclude action by other mechanisms provided for in the Charter that
are capable of assuming this increased responsiblity.'09 One alternative
mechanism that served this purpose in 1962 was the regional agency
created by the Rio Treaty." 6 This agency must continue to fulfill the
function of maintaining peace in the region through collective action.
Its authority derives from necessity, the major purposes and demands
of the signatories of the United Nations Charter, and the 1962
precedent.'
In sum, President Kennedy claimed that the Rio Treaty created a
regional organization within the meaning of article 52 of the United
Nations Charter, with the Organ of Consultation as its voice. 98 He jus-
tified his blockade of Cuba on the basis of the resolution issuing from
that agency and contended that his action conformed to the purposes
of the relevant United Nations provisions despite the fact that the Se-
curity Council had not given its authorization. 1 This interpretation
was not refuted by either the terms of the United Nations Charter con-
sistent with then-current interpretation,0" or by any formal declara-
tion in derogation of his action issuing from the United Nations.20' We
may, therefore, conclude that blockades under appropriate circum-
stances and of proper design, grounded on article 6 of the Rio Treaty,
qualify as lawful actions under the applicable provisions of the United
Nations Charter.
The foregoing arguments are supportive of a similar blockade in
192. Meeker, supra note 120, at 519.
193. A. RW AAT, supra note 143, at 192-93. Even the Soviet delegate to the United
Nations complained of the procedural ruses and stalling techniques which are used to
prevent the Security Council from acting effectively. J. HoUSTON, supra note 130, at 109.
194. McDougal, supra note 9, at 601.
195. Meeker, supra note 120, at 519.
196. Id.
197. McDougal, supra note 9, at 601.
198. Meeker, supra note 120, at 523.
199. Id.
200. McDougal, supra note 9, at 599.
201. Wright, supra note 184, at 564. The overwhelming conclusion of relevant com-
ments has been to support the lawfulness of the 1962 quarantine. See, e.g., McDougal,
supra note 9, at 603.
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the future if, after consideration of the evidence of necessity, the Organ
of Consultation were to find such a threat to the peace and security of
the continents as to warrant a resolution comparable to that issued in
1962.
CUSTOMARY RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE
Apart from the rights granted under the provisions of the United
Nations Charter and the Rio Treaty, President Reagan might rest his
action on the customary right of self-defense as recognized under tradi-
tional international law principles.10
Prior to the creation of the League of Nations, collective responsi-
bility on the part of the international community for the defense of
individual states was nonexistent.'03 States organized themselves,
sometimes collectively, sometimes individually, to defend their integ-
rity under color of an inherent right of self-defense.'" This right was
firmly entrenched in traditional international law and justified the use
of force to counter a wide range of situations including actual armed
attack, indirect attack,'05 and the threat of injury from attacks which
had not yet occurred.206 Moreover, the initial determination of the in-
tensity of the threat, and the method of self-protection to be used
under the particular circumstances, was left by international law to the
discretion of the injured party.2s°
Time and again, the right of self-defense legitimized the use of
coercive measures in cases that went beyond the confines of defending
against direct armed attacks.'" It has, under certain circumstances,
justified the interference of one state in the domestic affairs of another
in order to suppress revolutionary movements that threatened the se-
curity of the intervening state.'" It also justified the use of force to
202. See McDougal, supra note 9, at 600.
203. C. FENWICK, supra note 108, at 159. In attempting to organize a common de-
fense, the League suffered a series of failures beginning with Manchuria, and by 1939
collective action was no longer possible. J. HOUSTON, supra note 130, at 9.
204. C. FENWiCK, supra note 108, at 159.
205. Id. at 160.
206. Wright, supra note 184, at 560.
207. C. FENwiCK, supra note 108, at 166.
208. Id. at 168. Indeed, in more than one case a nation has been applauded for de-
manding redress based on the right to self-defense for insults to its national honor. Id.
209. Id. at 164. In the absence of international judicial insitutions for the settlement
of disputes and executive agencies for the protection of rights and the enforcement of
obligations, this right was occasionally alleged as a smoke screen to exercise illegal politi-
cal control over weaker states. Id. This potential for abuse should be diminished by the
structures for review created by the United Nations Charter. See McDougal, supra note
9, at 599.
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eliminate the menace of lawless conduct, perpetrated by one state
against another, on the generally accepted principle that serious and
unpunished transgressions would undermine the international commu-
nity and result in widespread anarchy.""
Even if the acts of aggression or threats to security were not
caused by the state per se, but rather by groups of irresponsible indi-
viduals within the state, that state might be legally invaded in the ex-
ercise of the right of self-defense if the necessity to do so were posed
by the gravest danger, and if the host state were either unable or un-
willing to prevent the threatened act.2"
The Monroe Doctrine, acquiesced in by the leading nations of the
world, rests on the right of self-defense against indirect attack and was
formulated in the context of the threat posed by the Quadruple Alli-
ance, in the event that the Alliance established its system in the Amer-
ican hemisphere.2 1 2 This doctrine has been reflected in the foreign poli-
cies of numerous other nations."'
Many times in the history of the United States, the President has
used force abroad and justified it as a defense of the rights and inter-
ests of person and property, so that it would not be considered as ei-
ther an act of war or a legitimate reason for a warlike response.2 1' This
principle was recognized by the United States in circumstances similar
to those inspiring President Reagan's threats to blockade Cuba.21 5 Dur-
ing the Canadian Rebellion of 1837, the United States condoned the
action of Great Britain in invading American waters and destroying
the Caroline, a ship employed by Americans, in an attempt to supply
arms to the Canadian revolutionaries.2 16 This condonation implicitly
210. C. FENWICK, supra note 108, at 166. Interventions based on humanitarian
grounds are firmly rooted in traditional international law and continue to be condoned
today. Id. at 168. See also Note, Humanitarian Intervention: The Invasion of Cambo-
dia, 2 N.Y.J. INT'L & Comp. L. 143 (1980).
211. C. FENWICK, supra note 108, at 167.
212. Id. at 169-70.
213. Id. at 170, 172. Some examples of the doctrine of self-defense which parallel the
Monroe Doctrine include the following: Great Britain's opposition to the establishment
of Russian and German naval bases near the Suez Canal; France's declaration of war
against Germany in 1870 to guarantee that France would not be menaced by a Hohenzol-
lern on the throne of Spain; Italy's desire to hold unrivaled control of the Adriatic after
World War I; and Japan's war against Russia based on the belief that the Russian pres-
ence in the Liaotung peninsula threatened the defense of the Empire and its interests in
Manchuria. Id. at 172-73.
214. E. CORWIN, supra note 8, at 198.
215. C. FENWICK, supra note 108, at 198.
216. E. CORWIN, supra note 8, at 198. This incident dealt with the right to defend
against an anticipated but as yet unexecuted attack. Id. See also M. McDoUGAL & F.
FELICuNO, supra note 131, at 231. Although the test formulated in the nineteenth cen-
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recognized that giving lawful effect to the right of self-defense, even
against indirect or imminent attack, serves to reduce international
aggressions.
17
To prevent abuse of this right, self-defense condoned by the gen-
eral community was traditionally limited by the requirements of neces-
sity and proportionality.2 16 Proportionality requires that the respond-
ing state's use of force does not excede the intensity and magnitude
reasonably necessary to promptly effect its self-defense.2 , Necessity
requires that military responses made in self-defense "should be lim-
ited to initiating coercion that is so intense as to have created in the
target state reasonable expectations . . . that a military action was in-
dispensably necessary to protect such consequential bases of power as
'territorial integrity' and 'political independence.' "220 In the modern
context this translates into reasonableness under the particular
circumstances.2 "
Although other world organizations dedicated to the goal of mini-
mizing international coercion have been formed since the decline of the
League of Nations, to require the target state to postpone defensive
action until authorized by the general community would reflect an un-
realistic view of the current abilities of organized society to protect its
individual members and it would spell disaster for the victims of ag-
gression. 22 Therefore, the traditional customary right of self-defense
continues to be indispensable if even a modicum of world order is to be
maintained..22  The recognition of authority to act independently in the
first instance, however, does not preclude general community review of
the claims of necessity and proportionality made by the original target
state.2 2 4 This sort of review is readily available through the authority
structures of the United Nations.2 5
CONCLUSION
The claim of countering an illegal attack, disguised as internal
change, is one of the most serious and difficult claims of self-defense to
tury was cast in highly restrictive langauge, it did not require that a state actually be
attacked to invoke its right of self-defense. Id.
217. See McDougal, supra note 9, at 598.
218. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 131, at 217-18.
219. Id. at 242.
220. Id. at 259.
221. McDougal, supra note 9, at 598.
222. M. McDoUOAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 131, at 218-19.
223. McDougal, supra note 9, at 598.
224. Id. at 599.
225. Id.
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review, 22 requiring a careful contextual analysis of the necessity and
proportionality of the measure taken."" Such a claim of self-defense
might be invoked as a justification for a future blockade of Cuba, espe-
cially if the United States Government can substantiate its claim that
Cuba, with Soviet backing, is coordinating and heavily influencing the
arming, organization and political direction of rebel activities in El Sal-
vador.2 28 In conclusion, therefore, this paper will note some of the more
obvious features of the alleged threat and proposed response in the
context of this potential confrontation.
22
9
The interest of the United States in promoting an essentially ho-
mogenous and democratic character in the nations occupying the
Western Hemisphere continues undiminished since its formal declara-
tion by means of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823.230 That this sentiment
is shared by El Salvador and other American states is evidenced by a
long history of multilateral arrangements organized to perpetuate this
goal. 31 Concomitantly, the advent of communism by revolution and
subversive movements anywhere within this zone of interest, is histori-
cally regarded as a grave and ominous threat to the peace and security
of both the United States and the Americas as a whole. 2
When Cuba embraced communism in 1960, it alienated itself from
participation in certain aspects of the economic and political life of the
American states.238 Thereafter, charges were leveled on several occa-
sions that Cuba was attempting to expand its influence among the Car-
226. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 131, at 192.
227. Id.
228. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1981, at A8, col. 5. Although the rebels are themselves
Salvadorans, Washington has called the situation a "textbook case of indirect armed ag-
gression," due to its external support and organization. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1981, at A8,
col. 5. If the indigenous rebels are being used as the tools of an external aggressor, it only
adds a new dimension to the threat to El Salvador, and neither that country nor the
general community need make too fine a distinction as to whether the threat comes
"from the outside versus the inside." M. McDouGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 131, at
192 n.164.
229. Before critical decisions are made, a serious analysis from general community
perspectives of necessity and proportionality requires examination of the major features
of the context of the threat and responses including the "participants, objectives, situa-
tion, base values, strategies and outcomes." McDougal, supra note 9, at 601.
230. Wright, supra note 184, at 552.
231. See J. HOUSTON, supra note 130, at 15.
232. Wright, supra note 184, at 563 n.61. Senate subcommittee reports as far back as
1963 cite "overwhelming" evidence of subversive and communist revolutionary move-
ments throughout the Western Hemisphere which are supported, aided and abetted by
Castro. Id.
233. Id. at 546.
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ribean republics.23' Once again the United States has levied accusa-
tions against Cuba, this time alleging that they have mounted a major
campaign to promote revolution in El Salvador.2' s
It has been specifically alleged that:
1) Cuba unified disparate groups of Salvadoran insurgents and
participated in the formulation of a strategy for a general offensive
against the present government of El Salvador.2' 6
2) Cuba orchestrates the delivery to rebel groups of arms gathered
from the Soviet Union, East Germany, Vietnam and other communist
states3" which reach Salvadoran rebels via underground networks in
Nicaragua, Honduras and Cost Rica.
8
3) Cuba conducts intensive three month training courses for Salva-
doran guerrillas, arranges for radical Arab States, such as Iraq, to
finance and train Salvadoran insurgents and engages in global propa-
ganda to facilitate its subversive objectives.'"9
4) Cuba's objective, with the aid of the Soviet Union and other
communist and radical states, is to overthrow the established govern-
ment of El Salvador and impose a communist regime in its place, re-
gardless of the will of the Salvadoran people."10
5) As a direct result of these and other communist backed efforts,
members of both the government of El Salvador and the civilian popu-
lation have been killed."'
Castro's continued public alignment with the Soviet Union has
provided Cuba with the economic and military resources that trans-
form it from a small third world nation into a highly sophisticated and
organized revolutionary base.""' Assuming, arguendo, that the allega-
tions of the Reagan administration are true, Cuba, by operating from
such a position of power and by using the same strategies as those used
234. Id. at 553 n.29. In 1959, for example, a State Department bulletin announced
that Castro initiated invasions of Panama, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and Ha-
iti. 44 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 107 (1961).
235. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
236. The Case Against Castro: Official Report, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 21,
1981, at 24-25.
237. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1981, at A8, col. 1.
238. U.S. NEws & WORLD RP,, supra note 236, at 25.
239. Id.
240. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1981, at A8, col. 1.
241. Id. The rebels are charged with conducting a campaign of terrorism that encom-
passes bombings, assassinations, kidnappings and seizing embassies. They have admitted
to killing over 6,000 non-combatants, government authorities and military personnel in
1980 alone. Id.
242. See U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., supra note 236, at 24.
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so effectively in Angola and Ethiopia,"" is engaged in activities that
pose a serious threat to the political independence of the government
of El Salvador and to the peace and security of the Western
Hemisphere.
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Thus far the Reagan administration is pursuing solutions designed
to bypass the use of force.2 43 If diplomacy fails, a blockade has been
tentatively proposed as the next step. Should adoption of this option
be necessary, it must be immediately reported to the Security Coun-
cil.24 6 It should then be carefully examined for its adherence to the
requirements of necessity and proportionality.
24 7
A blockade is traditionally regarded as an application of least force
applied on the high seas, with minimal interference in the internal do-
main of any state.2 4 8 A blockade has been considered to be an accept-
able method of gaining relief when attempts at non-coercive settle-
ments of a dispute failed and when its objectives were commensurate
to the injury.
2 4'
A blockade against Cuba would survive the scrutiny of the world
community if it is limited to the defensive goals of stopping the pro-
scribed behavior, is free of any covert or expansionist objectives, and
avoids threatening the political independence of any country.2 50 It
should not cause any unnecessary, irremediable destruction and the
force used must be limited in intensity and magnitude to that neces-
sary to prevent subversive activity that poses a serious threat to inter-
national peace. 51 Once these defense objectives have been achieved,
the blockade should be discontinued. 252
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Russia and Cuba of the consequences of continued aggression against El Salvador, the
solicitation of free world support for the United States' position and the backing of free
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